The State of Utah v. Ted Charles Hansen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1996
The State of Utah v. Ted Charles Hansen : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Rebecca C. Hyde; Richard P. Mauro; Attorneys for Appellant.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Attorney General; Jan Graham; Attorney General; Ruth
McCloskey; Deputy District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Hansen, No. 960516 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1996).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/386
COURT OF APPEA1 
BHtoF 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
"IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS K F U 
§0 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TED CHARLES HANSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant 
•A10 
DOCKET NO. ^bOSHo-Cft 
Case No. 960516-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL 
DISTRIBUTION, OFFERING, AGREEING, CONSENTING 
OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(1)(A)(II) (1996), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, 
PRESIDING. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-1080 
Ruth McCloskey 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TED CHARLES HANSEN, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 960516-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM A CONVICTION FOR UNLAWFUL 
DISTRIBUTION, OFFERING, AGREEING, CONSENTING 
OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, IN 
VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-37-
8(1)(A)(II) (1996), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, THE HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG, 
PRESIDING. 
REBECCA C. HYDE 
RICHARD P. MAURO 
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC. 
424 East 500 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (44 70) 
Assistant Attorney General 
JAN GRAHAM (1231) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Telephone: (801) 366-1080 
Ruth McCloskey 
Deputy District Attorney 
231 East 400 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iv 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF 
APPELLATE REVIEW 1 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 3 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 3 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 4 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 10 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I JURY INSTRUCTION 22 DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH 
OTHER JURY INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPERLY INSTRUCTS 
ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSE WHEN READ WITH 
THE INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE 12 
A. The Standard of Review 12 
B. Taking the Instructions as a Whole, 
Instruction 22 Adequately Instructs on 
the Element of Intent 13 
C. Contrary to Defendant's Argument, the 
Absence of a Reference to Intent in 
Instruction 22 did not Place it in Conflict 
with the Elements Instruction 18 
POINT II INSTRUCTION 21, READ IN CONNECTION WITH 
INSTRUCTION 22, IS A CORRECT DEFINITION OF 
THE PROSCRIBED ACT OF ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE 
A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 21 
i 
Instruction 21 and 22 Correctly Express the 
Broad Range of Culpable Conduct Proscribing 
"Arranging to Distribute a Controlled 
Substance" 22 
B. Instruction 21 is not an Aiding and Abetting 
Instruction in Violation of State v. Scott . 26 
POINT III THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT 
DEFENDANT ARRANGED TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 29 
POINT IV EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S OTHER UNCHARGED, 
CONTEMPORANEOUS DRUG-RELATED CONDUCT WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S 
STATE OF MIND AND INTENT 34 
A. The Standard for Admissibility in the 
Trial Court and the Standard of Review on 
Appeal 35 
B. The Evidence was Necessary to Show 
Defendant's Mental State and Intent to 
Commit the Offense 36 
C. Evidence of Defendant's Promises to Procure 
Other Drugs was Highly Probative of his 
Mental State and Intent to Commit the Charged 
Offense 37 
D. The Special Probativeness and Necessity of 
Evidence of Defendant's Promises to Procure 
Other Drugs is not Outweighed by its 
Prejudicial Effect 41 
E. Even if it was Error to Admit Evidence of 
Defendant's Uncharged Conduct, the Error 
was Harmless 45 
CONCLUSION 46 
ii 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A - Statutes and Rules 
ADDENDUM B - Instructions to the Jury 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
FEDERAL CASES 
Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 105 S. Ct. 1965 
(1985) 18, 20, 21 
United States v. Panter. 688 F.2d 268 (5th Cir. 1982) . . . 18 
United States v. Perez. 43 F.3d 1131 (7th Cir. 1994), 
cert, denied. 117 S. Ct. 153 (1996) 18, 19 
STATE CASES 
Evans v. People. 706 P.2d 795 (Colo. 1985) 24 
People v. Colantuono. 865 P.2d 704 (Cal. 1994) 24 
Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App.), 
cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996) 13 
State v. Archuleta. 850 P.2d 1232 (Utah), 
cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979 (1993) 12 
State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988) 41, 42 
State v. Brooks. 638 P.2d 537 (Utah 1981) 12 
State v. Chambers. 709 P.2d 321 (Utah 1985) 19 
State v. Daniels. 584 P.2d 880 (Utah 1978) 40 
State v. DeAlo. 748 P.2d 194 (Utah App. 1987) . . . 28, 39, 41 
State v. Dock. 585 P.2d 56 (Utah 1978) 15 
State v. Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. Rep. (Utah 1989) . . . . passim 
State v. Farrow. 919 P. 2d 50 (Utah App. 1996) 30 
State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424 (Utah 1989) . . . 36, 37, 39 
iv 
State v. Galleaos. 851 P.2d 1185 (Utah App. 1993) 25 
State v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50 (Utah 1993) . . . . . . . . . 2 
State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352 (Utah App. 1995), 
cert, denied. 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996) 29 
State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) 38, 39 
State v. Gray. 717 P.2d 1313 (Utah 1986) 23, 28 
State v. Harrison. 601 P.2d 922 (Utah 1979) . . 14, 22, 23, 25 
State v. Hendricks. 123 Utah 267, 258 P.2d 452 (Utah 1953) . 19 
State v. Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989)) 45 
State v. Johnson. 774 P.2d 1141 (Utah 1989) 12 
State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135 (Utah 1989) 38 
State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d at 1156 30 
State v. Laine. 618 P.2d 33 (Utah 1980) 14, 19 
State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391 (Utah App. 1994) 13, 15 
State v. Lopez. 789 P.2d 39 (Utah App. 1990) 38, 46 
State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993) 12, 15 
State v. Morrell. 803 P.2d 292 (Utah App. 1990) 40 
State v. ONeil. 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993) 40, 43 
State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 184 (Utah App. 1990) . 24, 28, 31, 32 
State v. Peterson. 841 P.2d 21 (Utah App. 1992) . . . . 25, 32 
State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443 (Utah 1983) 2 
State v. Pierce. 722 P.2d 780 (Utah 1986) 40 
V 
State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75 (Utah 1981) 13, 17, 19 
State v. Quads, 918 P.2d 883 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 
925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996) 2 
State v. Ramirez. 924 P.2d 366 (Utah App. 1996) . . 38, 40, 43 
State v. Roberts. 711 P.2d 235 (Utah 1985) 12 
State v. Rocco. 795 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1990) 39 
State v. Scott. 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987) 22, 26 
State v. Shickles. 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1988) . . . . 42, 44, 45 
State v. Taylor. 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991) 43 
State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461 (Utah App. 1993) . . . . 12, 13 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1996) passim 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1995) 26, 27 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1981) 26 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1996) 1 
Utah Rule of Evidence 403 3 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404 3 
vi 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 960516-CA 
v. : 
TED CHARLES HANSEN, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction for unlawful 
distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance, a second degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(ii) (1996), in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, the Honorable David S. Young, presiding. This Court has 
jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (1996) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did instruction 22, describing the actus reus of the 
offense, improperly omit reference to the required mental state, 
when the required mental state was referenced in eleven other 
instructions? "A trial court's refusal to give a jury 
instruction presents a question of law, which [this Court] 
review[s] for correctness, giving no particular deference to the 
trial court." State v. Ouada. 918 P.2d 883, 885 (Utah 
ADD.)(citing State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992)), 
cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
2. Did instruction 21, viewed in conjunction with other 
instructions, correctly define the offense of arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance? This issue presents a 
question of law, reviewed for correctness, as set forth in 
paragraph 1, above. 
3. Was the evidence sufficient to convict defendant of 
arranging to distribute cocaine? The reviewing court uwill 
reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence xonly when the 
evidence . . . is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently 
improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime.'" State 
v. Germonto. 868 P.2d 50, 55 (Utah 1993) (quoting State v. Verde, 
770 P.2d 116, 124 (Utah 1989); State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 
(Utah 1983) . 
4. Did the trial court correctly admit evidence of 
defendant's other contemporaneous bad act to prove his mental 
state and intent regarding the charged offense? Although the 
reviewing court will not review de novo the trial court's 
decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b), it "will examine a 
2 
trial court's decision under rule 404(b) with very limited 
deference, according it a relatively small degree of discretion.'' 
State v. Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. Rep. 18, 21 (Utah 1997). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The following determinative statutes and rules are set out 
in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (1996); 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 03; and 
Utah Rule of Evidence 404(b). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Ted Hansen, was charged with unlawful 
distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting or arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance (R. 8-10) . Prior to his first 
trial, defendant filed a motion in limine requesting the court to 
redact portions of a videotape of the cocaine transaction at 
issue here in which defendant discussed his parole and probation 
and his ability to provide additional drugs to undercover 
officers in the future (R. 28-30) . The prosecutor agreed to 
redact those parts of the videotape referring to defendant's 
parole and probation (R. 180). After three hearings, however, 
the trial court denied defendant's motion to redact those 
portions of the videotape pertaining to defendant's statements 
that he could provide additional drugs (R. 36, 223-26) . 
Following a mistrial (R. 54-55), the case, which included 
3 
the partially redacted videotape, was again tried before a jury, 
which convicted defendant of the offense as charged (R. Ill). 
The trial court sentenced defendant to the statutory term of one 
to fifteen years in the Utah State Prison (R. 119). Defendant 
subsequently petitioned the trial court for a certificate of 
probable cause (R. 133-35). The record does not reflect the 
court's disposition on this matter. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
During December of 1993, the FBI initiated a sting operation 
in Utah (R. 476). In August of 1994, Special Agent Richard 
Rasmussen, in charge of the operation, and West Valley City 
Detective Vince Garcia, posing as concrete contractors, purchased 
illegal drugs from their "office," a cover location at 1063 East 
3300 South in Salt Lake City (R. 477, 481, 555). Assisting them 
was Tim Ingram, a paid confidential witness (R. 478). 
A meeting was arranged for 10:00 a.m., August 2, 1994, in 
which Rasmussen and Garcia were to purchase cocaine from 
codefendant Tom Walker and defendant (R. 481-82, 484, 489) . 
Walker and defendant, previously identified to Rasmussen as "Tom" 
and "Ted," arrived at the meeting in defendant's car, which had 
also been previously identified by make, model, and license plate 
number during Rasmussen's discussions with Ingram and other 
4 
officers (R. 485, 504-06). When defendant, Walker and Ingram 
arrived at the pre-arranged location at 10:15 a.m., Detective 
Garcia met them outside the office (R. 488, 557). Garcia asked 
them for a show of "good faith," and they all pulled up their 
shirts to show they were not wearing any wires and did not have 
any weapons with them (R. 558-59). 
Inside the office, Rasmussen introduced himself as a 
concrete contractor with a contract at the airport. Walker, and 
defendant to a lesser extent, briefly and haphazardly discussed 
their prior work experience (R. 10 : 21: 00-30 : 20) .* Rasmussen also 
i 
took defendant's and Walker's names and social security numbers, 
conversed about possible jobs, and offered them beer in order to 
accurately identify his targets and to more effectively fit in 
with and deal with them (R. 489-91) . 
About ten minutes into the meeting, Walker asked Ingram to 
step outside with him (R. 10:30:25). During their brief absence, 
defendant chatted with Rasmussen and mentioned his most recent 
— 1 
I 
1
 Law officers recorded their meeting with defendant, 
Walker and Ingram with a concealed video camera (R. 4 87). The 
resulting redacted videotape (State's Ex. 1) constituted the 
prosecution's primary evidence at trial (R. 532, 547), and is 
cited in this brief by notation to the time of recording (hour, 
minute and second) as it appears superimposed on the video image. 
As noted at trial, the officers' backs are to the camera with 
Garcia on the left and Rasmussen on the right. Defendant faces 
the camera on the left, Walker is in the middle, and Ingram is on 
the far right (R. 488-89) . 
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job experience (R. 10:31:15-32:00). When Walker and Ingram 
returned, Ingram informed Rasmussen that the cocaine would cost 
four hundred and twenty-five dollars (R. 10:32:20). He also 
mentioned that Walker wanted a "service charge," meaning a 
portion of the cocaine for himself (R. 10:32:24; 495). Rasmussen 
summarily rejected the request for a service charge, complaining 
that he had once before been hurt in that kind of arrangement (R. 
10:32:30). Listening to this conversation, defendant shook his 
head negatively, plainly tracking the conversation (R. 10:32:33). 
The conversation briefly became heated when Walker became 
defensive about not knowing Rasmussen, and Rasmussen suggested 
that Walker might be a cop (R. 10:32:50-33:33). Plainly looking 
toward completing the transaction successfully, all of the 
parties made conciliatory gestures: Defendant said to Garcia, 
"He's not a cop, I'm not a cop"; Garcia confirmed that he had 
checked out defendant and Walker before they came in; and Walker 
agreed that their I.D.'s had been checked. Defendant nodded his 
head approvingly as the conversation between Walker and Rasmussen 
became amicable, and Walker and Rasmussen agreed on a new price 
of four hundred seventy-five dollars (R. 10:33:33-34:20). 
At this point, Rasmussen asked who had driven to the office, 
and defendant responded with an affirmative snap of his wrist and 
6 
point of his finger. Rasmussen, looking at Walker, but speaking 
of defendant, inquired of Walker, "You'll stay while he goes, is 
that the deal?" (R. 10:34:23-34:27). When Walker then suggested 
that he, rather than defendant, would go with Ingram, Rasmussen 
confirmed that defendant would remain at the office while Walker 
and Ingram went to pick up the cocaine, at which point defendant 
directed Walker to take his car and handed him the keys (R. 
I 
10:34:29-39) .2 Garcia then paid Ingram four hundred seventy-five 
dollars, and Walker and Ingram left the office while defendant 
and Rasmussen remained (R. 10:35:17-36:35). 
While waiting for Walker and Ingram to return with the 
cocaine, defendant furthered indicated that he was aware of the 
I 
details of this cocaine transaction and that Walker would handle 
it successfully. Defendant said that he had known Walker for ten 
years, had been in "business"3 with him with "no problems," and, 
I 
with a definitive motion of his hand, indicated that Walker's 
suppliers were "straight up" and that "[Tom] will be quick" (R. 
10:40:13-25). Defendant said that he and Walker did not travel 
1 2
 At trial, Rasmussen explained that it is typical in drug 
deals for somebody to remain behind as a kind of "collateral" to 
prevent the theft of the purchaser's money (R. 523). 
| 3 According to Rasmussen, "doing business" was jargon for 
the drug business (R. 493). 
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closely together, but that because he (defendant) had a car and 
Walker did not, Walker usually called him up for a ride (R 
10:40:27-35). Answering Rasmussen's question about what his cut 
was, defendant said that he udid not usually ask for shit," 
because he had known Walker for a long time and that he was 
really a carpenter making his money framing prior to being laid 
off two months prior (R. 10:40:45-56). Later, when Rasmussen 
became impatient, defendant said, "I know where they [Walker and 
Ingram] were going to, and they should be back in just a second," 
that they were "just going to 33rd and 3rd East," but that they 
first * [had] to page someone to come meet them" because "these 
guys don't like anyone coming to their house" (R. 11:07:37-8:06). 
Still later, when Rasmussen suggested that Walker and Ingram had 
"skipped," defendant suggested that Rasmussen page Walker using 
the number 4117 defendant's identifier (R. 11:14:02-16). When 
Walker and Ingram returned with the cocaine and the transaction 
was being completed, Rasmussen quipped that everyone was "being 
taken care of except Ted," meaning that everyone except defendant 
was getting something from this sale of cocaine. In response, 
Walker said, "Oh, I'll take care of Ted," and defendant nodded 
affirmatively and patted Walker's shoulder approvingly (R. 
11:28:00-04) . 
8 
During Walker's and Ingram's cocaine run, defendant also 
acknowledged that he had sold marijuana off and on for the past 
i 
eight years (R. 10:39:50-40:08). When Rasmussen asked about 
I 
soliciting additional drug business, defendant said that he could 
supply "just about anything," and referred specifically to LSD 
I 
and psychedelic mushrooms. Defendant also discussed selling 
marijuana with the officers (R. 11:08:50-10:00). Although he 
agreed to supply LSD to Garcia the next morning for two hundred 
dbllars, pending contact with his supplier (R. 11:41:25-46:00), 
defendant did not want to discuss delivery of drugs when Garcia 
called him later that evening and did not supply any LSD to 
Garcia (R. 562, 566). 
I Testifying for the defense, Walker claimed that he told 
defendant that a friend said his boss needed workers, that he 
r^ ever discussed the drug transaction with defendant, and that 
I 
defendant did not know what was going on (R. 536-38). On cross 
I 
examination Walker did not remember at first that defendant was 
present when the cocaine transaction was discussed (R. 539). 
When he later acknowledged defendant's presence, he claimed that 
he took defendant's car to go to the store for a drink (R. 54 0, 
545). Walker also failed to recall that at the end of the 
meeting he said of defendant, "I'll take care of him" (R. 543). 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Instruction 22, when read in conjunction with the other 
instructions, did not improperly suggest to the jury that intent 
was not a necessary element of the offense. The jury was given 
eleven other instructions, including an elements instruction, in 
which it was evident that defendant had to possess the requisite 
intent before the jury could find him guilty of the charged 
offense. The jury was also specifically told to consider the 
instructions collectively, and not to view any one instruction in 
isolation. 
POINT J! 
Instructions 21 and 22, read together, correctly instructed 
the jury on the definition of "arranging" to distribute a 
controlled substance. Instruction 21 was based on the Utah 
Supreme Court's broad definition of "arranging" formulated in 
State v. Harrison and subsequently approved of in numerous other 
cases. Instruction 21 could not have left the jury with any 
confusion as to what type of conduct was prohibited under section 
58-37-8(1)(a)(ii). Instruction 21 was also not the equivalent of 
an aiding and abetting instruction and did not impermissibly 
broaden the actus reus for arranging to distribute. The 
instruction simply recited the definition of "arranging" approved 
of by the Harrison court. Even if instruction 21 represented an 
incorrect statement of law, defendant has not demonstrated he was 
prejudiced by it. 
10 
PQIflT H I 
The evidence was sufficient to support defendant's 
conviction for arranging to distribute a controlled substance. 
This Court should not consider this issue on appeal since 
defendant fails to marshal the evidence in support of the verdict 
and show that it is insufficient. Even on the merits however, 
defendant's argument fails. Defendant evidently knew before he 
arrived at the cover location that he would be assisting in a 
I 
drug sale by providing a car, he was present during the drug 
transaction and negotiation, he exhibited personal knowledge 
about the source of the drugs and the reliability of codefendant, 
and he acknowledged he was being compensated for attending and 
arranging the buy. Defendant also offered to sell the undercover 
officers LSD and marijuana in the future. 
POINT IV 
The trial court correctly admitted evidence of defendant's 
promises to procure other drugs as evidence of mental state and 
intent on the charged offense under rule 404(b), Utah Rules of 
Evidence. The evidence was necessary because the issue of intent 
was contested, and it was highly probative because defendant's 
promises constituted contemporaneous conduct virtually identical 
to the charged offense. Also, the evidence was properly admitted 
under rule 403, Utah Rules of Evidence, because the evidence was 
highly probative and not unfairly prejudicial. Any error in 
admitting the evidence was harmless because other evidence of 
defendant's intent was substantial and an appropriate cautionary 
instruction on the use of otr.er bad act evidence was given. 
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ARGUMENT 
JURY INSTRUCTION 22 DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH OTHER JURY 
INSTRUCTIONS AND PROPERLY INSTRUCTS ON THE ELEMENTS OF 
THE OFFENSE WHEN READ WITH THE INSTRUCTIONS AS A WHOLE 
Defendant argues that jury instruction 22 not only 
improperly omitted the element of intent, but also positively 
instructed the jury that intent was not an element required to 
convict. The resulting conflict with other instructions, he 
argues, leaves doubt about whether the jury relied on the 
incorrect instruction and amounts to reversible error. 
Appellant's Br. at 10. However, none of these claims are 
supported when the jury instructions are read as whole. 
A. The Standard of Review, 
In State v. Lucero. 866 P.2d 1 (Utah App. 1993), this Court 
outlined the standard of review applied to a challenged jury 
instruction: 
A challenge to a jury instruction as incorrectly 
stating the law presents a question of law, which we 
review for correctness." State v. Archuleta, 850 P.2d 
1232, 1244 (Utah), cert, denied. 510 U.S. 979 (1993). 
Jury instructions must be read and evaluated as a 
whole. State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 
1989). They must accurately and adequately inform a 
criminal jury as to the basic elements of the crime 
charged. State v. Roberts, 711 P.2d 235, 239 (Utah 
1985). However, if taken as a whole they fairly 
instruct the jury on the law applicable to the case, 
the fact that one of the instructions, standing alone, 
is not as accurate as it might have been is not 
reversible error. State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 542 
(Utah 1981); State v. Tennvson. 850 P.2d 461, 470 (Utah 
12 
App. 1993) . 
IdL at 3; £££ filgQ State v. Larsen. 876 P.2d 391, 396 (Utah App. 
1994) . 
"Jury instructions are to be considered and construed as a 
whole and reconciled whenever possible; conversely, they are not 
to be considered in isolation in order to predicate a claim of 
error. . . . It is presumed that the jury read and followed all 
of the court's instructions." State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75, 81 
(Utah 1981) (Hall, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
A reviewing court will "reverse a trial court's decision on 
the basis of an instruction improperly submitted to the jury only 
where the party challenging the propriety of the instruction 
'demonstrates prejudice stemming from the instructions viewed in 
the aggregate.'" Salt Lake City v. Smoot. 921 P.2d 1003, 1006 
(Utah App.) (quoting State v. Haston. 811 P.2d 929, 931 (Utah 
App. 1991), rev'd on other grounds. 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993)), 
cert, denied. 925 P.2d 963 (Utah 1996). 
B. Taking the Instructions as a Whole, Instruction 22 
Adequately Instructs on the Element of Intent. 
Instruction 22 states: 
Under the law in the State of Utah any act in 
furtherance of arranging to distribute a 
controlled substance is a criminal offense 
13 
pursuant to statute. 
(R. 102, attached at Addendum B). It is evident that this 
instruction was excerpted from State v. Harrison, 601 P.2d 922 
(Utah 1979), and that it omits Harrison's plain recognition that 
any act in furtherance of an arrangement to distribute a 
controlled substance for sale4 must be coupled with an intent to 
distribute. IJL. at 924.5 
If instruction 22 stood alone as an elements instruction, 
without any additional or clarifying instructions informing the 
jury that the State was required to also prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that defendant's criminal conduct was 
intentional, it would be incorrect. See State v. Laine, 618 P.2d 
33, 35 (Utah 1980) (finding inadequate an elements instruction, 
uncured by the information instruction, which lacked the 
necessary intent element in a theft conviction). 
However, the law is well-established that a jury instruction 
4
 At issue in Harrison was whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1979) was unconstitutionally vague. Harrison. 
601 P.2d at 923. That section prohibited arranging to distribute 
controlled substances for value. Id. In 1987 the statute was 
amended, omitting the "for value" element and combining the 
offenses of "arranging" and "distributing" into one section. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii) (Supp. 1987). 
5
 A fuller discussion of Harrison, including its plain 
references to a required showing of intent to distribute, coupled 
with the necessary conduct, appears at Point II of this brief. 
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is not viewed in isolation from the charge as a whole. See 
Larsen. 876 P.2d at 396-97 (finding no error in the elements 
instruction which substituted the statutory term, "purpose to 
deprive," for *intent," particularly where five other 
instructions properly equated the two terms and stated the 
necessity of intent in proving criminal conduct); Lucero, 866 
P.2d at 3 (recognizing that one part of the challenged 
instruction might be confusing viewed in isolation, but when 
considered with another instruction clarifying the confusing 
reference to intent, the instructions as a whole were neither 
inadequate nor misleading); accord State v. Dock, 585 P.2d 56, 57 
(Utah 1978) (harmless error for elements jury instruction to omit 
statutory requirement of assault, i.e., "intending to commit 
bodily injury," where other jury instructions defined and 
referenced statutory intent requirement). 
Rather than standing alone, instruction 22 is imbedded among 
eleven other relevant instructions, including an elements 
instruction which defendant concedes contains the necessary 
intent element. See Appellant's Br. at 13. These instructions 
collectively define intent, instruct that intent is a necessary 
element of the charged offense, suggest how intent may by proven, 
place intent in the context of "arranging," and urge the jury not 
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to single out any jury instruction, but to consider the 
instructions as a whole. Specifically, "intent" is discussed in 
following instructions: #1 (R. 83) (information instruction, 
alleging that defendant Mid knowingly and intentionally . . . 
arrange to distribute a controlled substance"); #3 (R. 84) 
(informing that the State has the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt all the allegations of the information); #5 (R. 
85) (instructing the jury that it must try the facts presented by 
the allegations of the information); #14 (R. 94) (stating that a 
crime consists of both the prohibited conduct and the 
"appropriate mental state . . . with regard to the conduct 
prohibited by law," proof of which was required beyond a 
reasonable doubt); #15 (R. 95) (stating that "it is unlawful . . 
. to knowingly and intentionally . . . arrange to distribute a 
controlled . . . substance"); #16 (R. 96) (defining "knowing" and 
"intentional"); #17 (R. 97) (instructing that intent denotes a 
state of mind which may be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances); #18 (R. 98) -(distinguishing intent 
and motive); #20 (R. 100) (elements instruction, specifically 
referencing intent as an element of the charged offense, and 
requiring the finding of all elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
before finding defendant guilty); #21 (R. 101) (defining 
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"arranging" as "witting" or "intentional" lending of aid); and 
#23 (R. 103) (instructing that discussions of other drugs can 
only be considered for issue of intent in cocaine distribution 
charge). 
Additionally, instruction #27 is particularly relevant to 
this discussion. It reads: 
If in these instruction [sic] any rule, direction 
or idea has been stated in varying ways, no emphasis 
thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. 
For that reason, you are not to single out any certain 
sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and 
ignore the others, but you are to consider all the 
instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the 
light of all the others. 
(R. 107) .6 As noted above, it is presumed that the jury read and 
followed all the instructions. See Potter, 627 P.2d at 81 (Hall, 
J., dissenting). Given the number of instructions specifically 
requiring that the jury find the requisite intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt before convicting defendant, and particularly 
given instruction 27, which specifically directed the jury to 
consider the instructions as a whole, it is inconceivable that 
the jury could have been misled by instruction 22 into believing 
that it merely needed to find defendant committed any act in 
furtherance of arranging to distribute without also finding that 
6
 All jury instructions directed to the actus reus and the 
mens rea of arranging to distribute are attached at Addendum B. 
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defendant acted with the required intent. 
C, Contrary to Defendant's Argument, the Absence of a 
Reference to Intent in Instruction 22 did not Place it 
in Conflict with the Elements Instruction, 
At no point does defendant acknowledge the mass of 
instructions directing the jury to consider defendant's intent as 
a necessary element of the offense. However, evidently 
recognizing the unpersuasiveness of a challenge based on an 
isolated view of instruction 22, defendant claims instruction 
22's failure to mention intent creates an actual conflict with 
the elements instruction. Appellant's Br. at 13-17. In so 
arguing, defendant relies on authority in which the challenged 
instructions were either so contradictory or inconsistent with 
other instructions that a reasonable juror could not 
satisfactorily apply the charge as a whole, but would have to 
disregard one of the instructions and possibly select the 
incorrect or confusing instruction at the expense of the correct 
one.7 Defendant particularly relies on United States v. Perez, 
7
 See Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 316-25, 105 S. Ct. 
1965, 1972-77 (1985) (stating instruction establishing a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption of criminal intent based on 
proof of predicate facts improperly shifted to the defendant the 
burden to prove his innocence, and could not be cured by a single 
instruction that criminal intent cannot be presumed or other 
instructions which were not necessarily inconsistent with the 
incorrect instruction); United States v. Panter. 688 F.2d 268, 
270 (5th Cir. 1982) (asserting an instruction stating self-
defense was not a defense to the offense could not be cured by 
another, irreconcilable, ''diametrically opposed" instruction, or 
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43 F.3d 1131 (7th Cir. 1994), cert, denied. 117 S. Ct. 153 
(1996). See Appellant's Br. at 16. In Perez, the defendant was 
convicted of assault with intent to commit murder- Id. at 1132. 
The elements instruction stated that the government was required 
to prove that the defendant acted consciously and with intent to 
kill the victim. Id. at 1134. However, the instruction also 
stated that the government need not prove that the defendant had 
a subjective intent to kill and that it would be sufficient to 
find reckless and wanton conduct. Id. The Seventh Circuit held 
that because the instruction specifically postulated an incorrect 
basis for conviction under the statute, in direct contradiction 
of the correct mens rea requirement, the jury had been improperly 
instructed on all the elements of the offense. Id. at 1138-39; 
accord Potter. 627 P.2d at 78 (finding error where challenged 
instruction specifically stated, contrary to law, that specific 
intent to violate the law was not required, and that defendant 
by reading the instructions as a whole); State v. Chambers. 709 
P.2d 321, 324-27 (Utah 1985) (holding it is unconstitutional 
error to give two instructions which created a mandatory 
rebuttable presumption of guilt upon proof of predicate facts, 
without adequate clarifying instructions under Franklin); Laine, 
618 P.2d at 35 (finding reversible error where no instruction 
clearly required the State to prove the requisite intent beyond a 
reasonable doubt); State v. Hendricks. 123 Utah 267, 258 P.2d 
452, 453 (Utah 1953) (finding where there are no additional 
clarifying instructions, irreconcilable instructions, 
alternatively placing burdens of proof on defendant and on State, 
could only confuse or mislead jury). 
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merely had to engage in conduct constituting the elements of the 
offense). 
However, neither Perez, nor any other authority defendant 
relies upon, applies to the challenged instruction in this case. 
First, instruction 22 in no way suggests the jury need not find 
that defendant acted with the requisite intent. Rather, it fails 
to mention intent. The obvious reason for this omission is that 
the instruction is plainly focused only on the actus reus 
constituting '"arranging" under the statute. Intent, having been 
so exhaustively identified as an element of the offense 
elsewhere, thus has no place in instruction 22. Recognizing the 
limited purpose of instruction 22, its failure to mention intent 
does not contradict the elements instruction, but merely 
clarifies the conduct required to prove the offense. 
Secondly, when viewed as a whole, none of the charges to the 
juries in cases relied upon by defendant dispelled the confusion 
engendered by genuinely contradictory and inconsistent 
instructions. Cf. Franklin, 471 U.S. at 322, 105 S. Ct. at 1975 
("Nothing in these specific sentences or in the charge as a whole 
makes clear to the jury that one of these contradictory 
instructions carries more weight than the other."). As set out 
above, eleven instructions collectively and explicitly instructed 
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the jury that it could not convict defendant unless it found 
beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant acted intentionally to 
arrange to distribute controlled substances. Even if the jury 
misunderstood the limited purpose of instruction 22, it would 
have had to disregard almost half of the instructions in order to 
convict defendant without a finding of intent. The jury also 
would have had to completely ignore instruction 27 which 
instructed the jurors to consider the instructions as a whole 
without singling out any individual instruction (R. 107). 
Defendant's argument assumes an extraordinary degree of juror 
incompetence, beliing the test of constitutional acceptability of 
the instructions. See Franklin, 471 U.S. at 316, 105 S. Ct. at 
1972 (noting the constitutional question is "what a reasonable 
juror could have understood the charge as meaning"). In sum, any 
failure to reference intent in instruction 22 could not have 
misled the jury into believing that the instruction nullified the 
State's burden to prove defendant acted with the required intent. 
POINT II 
INSTRUCTION 21, READ IN CONNECTION WITH INSTRUCTION 22, 
IS A CORRECT DEFINITION OF THE PROSCRIBED ACT OF 
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE. 
Defendant principally claims that instructions 21 and 22 
incorrectly and confusingly attempt to define "arranging," a term 
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of common understanding, with broad language taken out of context 
from Harrison. As a result, he argues, instruction 21 was 
essentially an aiding and abetting instruction which made 
culpable an impermissibly broad range of conduct, in plain 
violation of State v. Scott. 732 P.2d 117 (Utah 1987). 
Appellant's Br. at 18-21. However, Harrison and a number of 
recent cases clearly instruct that "arranging" is indeed a very 
broad term, the breadth of which is accurately set out in 
instructions 21 and 22, read in conjunction. Additionally, 
instruction 21, notwithstanding its use of the word, "aid," is 
neither prejudicially confusing nor essentially an instruction on 
accomplice liability which is proscribed under Scott. 
A. Instructions 21 and 22 Correctly Express the Broad 
Range of Culpable Conduct Proscribing "Arranging to 
Distribute a Controlled Substance". 
In Harrison, the defendant was convicted under the 
predecessor statute to Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1996), 
prohibiting the arranging for the distribution of a controlled 
substance.8 Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923. The defendant claimed 
the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Id. In rejecting the 
claim, the supreme court stated: 
8
 As discussed above, see p. 14, subsection 8(1) (a) (ii), 
omits the "for value" element set out in former subsection 
8(1)(a)(iv), and combines "arranging" with "distribution." 
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Breadth of coverage, in and of itself, does not render 
a statute unconstitutionally vague. A statute may 
legitimately proscribe a broad spectrum of conduct with 
a very few words, so long as the outer perimeters of 
such conduct are clearly defined. The statute in 
question accomplishes this by specifying that any 
activity leading to or resulting in the distribution 
for value of a controlled substance must be engaged in 
knowingly or with intent that such distribution would, 
or would be likely to, occur. Thus, any witting or 
intentional lending of aid in the distribution of 
drygs, whatever form i t tfrkes, is proscribed by the 
act. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thereafter, the court repeated itself 
three more times, emphasizing that "any act in furtherance of an 
arrangement [to distribute] constitutes the criminal offense, 
described by the statute." IsL at 924; see frlSQ State v. Gray. 
717 P.2d 1313, 1320-21 (Utah 1986) (reaffirming Harrisons 
statement that "any witting or intentional lending of aid in the 
distribution of drugs, in whatever form the aid takes, is 
proscribed by the act"). 
Instruction 21 states: 
"Arranging" means any witting or intentional 
lending of aid in any form of any act in furtherance of 
aiding in the distribution of controlled substances. 
(R. 101). 
Instruction 22 states: 
Under the law in the State of Utah any act in 
furtherance of arranging to distribute a controlled 
substance is a criminal offense pursuant to statute. 
(R. 102). Read in conjunction with each other and with the 
numerous other instructions stating the required mental state, 
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these two instructions faithfully state, by their terms, the 
broad reach of the "arranging" statute under Harrison. 
Defendant, nonetheless, argues that "arranging" is an 
ordinary, non-technical term that would be better defined by a 
dictionary, and that the language borrowed by the instructions 
from Harrison is inappropriately taken out of context. 
Appellant's Br. at 18-19. The State acknowledges that other 
jurisdictions have held that language excerpted from an appellate 
opinion may not translate with clarity in jury instructions. See 
Appellant's Br. at 11, 18-19.9 However, that general caution is 
put to rest by this Court's finding in State v. Pelton, 801 P.2d 
184 (Utah App. 1990). In Pelton. the defendant played a limited 
role as a go-between in a drug buy with undercover police and was 
convicted of arranging to distribute a controlled substance. Id. 
at 185. Rejecting the defendant's claim that the supreme court 
in Harrison had unconstitutionally broadened the application of 
the arranging statute, this Court stated: 
In Harrison the Utah Supreme Court holds that the 
9
 See e.g.,People v. Colantuono. 865 P.2d 704, 714 (Cal. 
1994) (cautioning against derivative application of appellate 
decision's statement of substantive law in jury instruction); 
Evans v. People, 706 P.2d 795, 799-800 (Colo. 1985)(rejecting the 
selective excerpting of language from an appellate opinion 
resulted in inaccurate and contradictory statement of entrapment 
defense). 
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arranging statute is such that "[t]he citizen of 
average intelligence is left with no confusion as to 
what type of conduct is forbidden." 601 P.2d at 923-
24. We see Harrison as a legitimate definition of 
"arrange" as used in Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) 
(Supp. 1989) . 
Id. at 186.10 This statement undercuts defendant's "selective 
excerpting" argument in two ways. First, it explicitly 
recognizes that Harrison was not merely a source of language 
referring to the application of section 58-37-8 (1(a) (iv), but 
rather an opinion focusing on the constitutional adequacy of that 
section in defining the offense, the very issue raised in this 
case on appeal. Second, the opinion expressly affirms that the 
supreme court's description of culpable conduct under the statute 
is a legitimate definition of "arrange" as used in the statute 
defendant was convicted under in this case. Since the language 
defining the offense in Harrison was substantially restated in 
instructions 21 and 22, those instructions adequately instructed 
the jury on the offense of arranging to distribute controlled 
substances. 
Pelton's adoption of Harrison as a proper definition of 
"arranging to distribute controlled substances," has subsequently 
been approved by two other opinions issued by this Court. See 
State v. Galleaos, 851 P.2d 1185, 1190 (Utah App. 1993); State v. 
Peterson, 841 P.2d 21, 25 n.2 (Utah App. 1992). 
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B. Instruction 21 is not an Aiding and Abetting 
Instruction in Violation of State v. Scott. 
Defendant argues that by taking the language from Harrison 
out of context, instruction 21 effectively describes a form of 
aiding and abetting, thereby impermissibly broadening the actus 
reus for arranging to distribute in violation of State v. Scott. 
Appellant's Br. at 20-21. This claim grossly expands the express 
the language of instruction 21, thereby misapplying Scott to this 
case. 
In Scott, the defendant was charged with distribution under 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) (1986) . Scott. 732 P.2d at 
118. The trial court submitted an aiding and abetting 
instruction using the language of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 
(1981), verbatim.11 Id. On appeal, the defendant challenged his 
conviction arguing that Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-19 (1986) and Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-103(1),12 foreclosed the State from using law 
11
 Section 76-2-202 provides: 
Every person, acting with the mental state required for 
the commission of an offense who directly commits the 
offense, who solicits, requests, commands, encourages, 
or intentionally aids another person to engage in 
conduct which constitutes an offense shall be 
criminally liable as a party for such conduct. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-202 (1996). 
12
 Section 58-37-19 provided: 
It is the purpose of this act to regulate and control 
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outside the provisions of the Controlled Substances Act. Id. at 
119. The supreme court agreed, particularly finding that the 
actus reus under section 76-2-202, to wit: soliciting, 
requesting, commanding, encouraging, or aiding, was different 
than the actus reus under section 58-37-8(1) (a) (iv), consisting 
of an act of agreement, consent, offer, or arrangement to 
distribute. Id. at 120. The court criticized the prosecutor for 
brushing aside how the exchange of drugs and money took place, 
stating that under the Act, defendant's role in the exchange was 
very significant. Id. The court thus found error in giving the 
aiding and abetting instruction. Id. 
No such error occurred in this case. Plainly, the trial 
the substances designated within § 58-37-4, and 
whenever the requirements prescribed, the offenses 
defined or the penalties imposed relating to substances 
controlled by this act shall be or appear to be in 
conflict with Title 58, Chapter 17 [the Pharmacy 
Practices Act] or any other laws of this state, the 
provisions of this act shall be controlling. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-19 {repealed by 1992 Utah Laws 541, 611). 
Section 76-1-103(1) provides: 
The provisions of this code shall govern the 
construction of, the punishment for, and defenses 
against any offense defined in this code or, except 
where otherwise specifically provided or the context 
otherwise requires, any offense defined outside this 
code, provided such offense was committed after the 
effective date of this code. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-103 (1995). 
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court did not give an aiding and abetting instruction. Moreover, 
instruction 21 is not the equivalent of such an instruction. The 
instruction merely states that "arranging" is "any witting or 
intentional lending of aid in any form in furtherance of aiding 
in the distribution of controlled substances" (R. 101). While 
the State acknowledges that the word "aid" is used twice, that 
repetition does no more than focus the jury on the breadth of 
activity reached under the Act. Although instruction 21 may 
appear to equate "arranging" with "aiding," it goes no further 
than the definition established in Harrison, which expressly 
states that "any witting or intentional lending of aid, in 
whatever form the aid takes, is proscribed by the act." 
Harrison, 601 P.2d at 923. This is also precisely the language 
upheld in Gray against a vagueness challenge, see Gray. 717 P.2d 
at 1320, and approved and adopted by this Court in Pelton and its 
progeny as a definition of "arranging". See Pelton, 801 P.2d at 
186. In sum, instruction 21, read in conjunction with 
instruction 22, correctly defined the offense of arranging to 
distribute a controlled substance.13 
13
 In any event, even if instruction 21 was incorrect, the 
error was harmless. See State v. DeAlo. 748 P.2d 194, 198 (Utah 
App. 1987) (finding error where aiding and abetting instruction 
was given in possession with intent to distribute case under 
Scott, but holding it was harmless where, on the apparent 
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PQINT HI 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO PROVE THAT DEFENDANT 
ARRANGED TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
When examining the sufficiency of the evidence in a criminal 
jury trial, this Court "begin[s] with the threshold issue of 
statutory interpretation, which [it] decide[s] as a matter of 
law." State v. Gibson. 908 P.2d 352, 355 (Utah App. 1995)(citing 
State v. Souza. 846 P.2d 1313, 1316-17 (Utah App. 1993)), cert, 
denied, 917 P.2d 556 (Utah 1996). With regard to the facts, this 
Court "will review the evidence and all inferences which may 
reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the 
verdict of the jury." Id. (quoting State v. Johnson. 821 P.2d 
1150, 1156 (Utah 1991)). This Court "will reverse a conviction 
only when the evidence, viewed in light of [the reviewing 
strength of the evidence, the reviewing court found that the 
defendant was convicted of the principal offense and not of 
aiding and abetting). Defendant asserts that he was prejudiced 
because instruction 21 allowed the jury to find that his 
"passive" role constituted "arranging," culpable conduct which 
the prosecutor argued to the jury in closing. Appellant's Br. at 
22-23. However, even if the instruction defines culpable conduct 
more broadly than does the statute, the evidence clearly shows 
defendant to have been a knowing link in the illegal transaction 
(See discussion at Point III) (discussing the sufficiency of 
evidence). Moreover, contrary to defendant's claim, the 
prosecutor did not simply argue that defendant could be found 
guilty merely on a showing that "doing anything in furtherance of 
the distribution of cocaine" constituted "arranging." 
Appellant's Br. at 22. The prosecutor explicitly informed the 
jury that punishment could not be premised purely on a 
defendant's conduct and that the evidence would have to show 
defendant's knowing and intentional involvement in the illegal 
transaction (R. 594-95). 
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court's] interpretation of the statute, xis sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must 
have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he [or she] was convicted.'" Id. (quoting 
Johnson. 821 P.2d at 1156)). 
Defendant principally argues that, at most, the evidence 
established that he merely "knew that Walker was selling cocaine 
to the agents, and he knew that Walker was using his 
[defendant's] car to purchase the drugs." Appellant's Br. at 25. 
Such knowledge, he argues, is insufficient to show that he played 
the necessary instrumental role he claims is required for a 
conviction of arranging to distribute a controlled. Appellant's 
Br. at 24-26. Although he cites appropriate case law, defendant 
first fails to fully marshal the evidence and then fails to 
adequately apply the law to the facts supporting his 
conviction.14 
Pelton, cited by defendant, is instructive in this case 
14
 To meet his burden of production, defendant must marshal 
all the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate 
that even viewing it in the light most favorable to the verdict 
below, the evidence is insufficient to support the verdict. 
Failure to so marshal the evidence waives an appellant's right to 
have his claim of insufficiency considered on appeal. State v. 
Farrow, 919 P.2d 50, 53 n.l (Utah App. 1996) (citing State v. 
Moore. 802 P.2d 732, 738-39 (Utah App. 1990)). 
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because it sets out the intentional, even if modest, role 
defendant must play to support an arranging to distribute 
conviction. In Pelton. undercover police set up a drug buy. 
Pelton. 801 P.2d at 185. Pursuant to instructions from an 
intermediary, undercover police and the confidential informant 
picked up the defendant. Id. The defendant directed the police 
to a store where they would make a phone call to the person who 
would bring the drugs. Id. At the store, the defendant spoke 
to the drug supplier and then left. Id. The drug purchase was 
later consummated between the police and the supplier. Id. On 
appeal, the defendant pointed out that he had not introduced the 
supplier to the police, that he never possessed the cocaine, that 
he never directed police to the house where the cocaine was 
purchased, that he was not present when the transaction occurred 
and that he never discussed prices or handled any money. Id. 
Based on those facts, the defendant claimed the evidence for 
conviction was insufficient because it failed to show that he was 
a participant in the arrangement. Id. 
In rejecting the defendant's claim, this Court found that 
there was ample evidence that the defendant knew he was 
responsible for bringing the parties to the drug buy together, 
and therefore held that the defendant acted knowingly and 
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intentionally in arranging the sale of the cocaine. Id. at 185-
86; see also Peterson. 841 P.2d at 26 (finding evidence that 
defendant would ask her supplier if he could obtain cocaine was 
sufficient to show that the defendant arranged to distribute 
drugs). 
Similarly, the videotape clearly shows Walker, defendant's 
companion, negotiating with Agent Rasmussen for the sale of 
cocaine, during which time the purchase price, Walker's request 
for a service charge, and the fact that defendant and Walker were 
not cops were discussed (R. 10 : 32 : 20-34 : -20) . During these 
negotiations, defendant clearly tracked the conversation, 
assisting in the discussion and nodding in understanding as the 
parties approached agreement. When it was agreed that defendant 
would remain and Walker would pick up the cocaine, defendant 
directed Walker to take his car and handed him the keys (R. 
10:34:23-39). While waiting for Walker to return, defendant 
repeatedly assured the officers of Walker's reliability, his long 
association with Walker, and his knowledge of Walker's suppliers 
and their address (R. 10:40:13-56, 11:07:37-8:06). When Walker 
returned and Rasmussen indicated that everyone but defendant was 
making some money from this drug sale, Walker acknowledged that 
he would "take care of Ted," and defendant nodded affirmatively 
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and patted Walker's shoulder approvingly (R. 11:28:00-04). Also 
while waiting for Walker to return, defendant agreed to sell LSD 
and marijuana to the officers, thereby undermining his defense 
that he was merely a passive observer of the transaction and 
demonstrating his intent to sell drugs on that occasion (R. 
11:08:50-10:00, 11:41:25-46:00, 562, 566). 
While it is plain that defendant's participation in the 
negotiations constitutes "arranging" even under his proffered 
definition of the term,15 defendant neglects to mention the 
crucial pre-negotiation facts of his "arranging." A meeting had 
been pre-arranged in which Rasmussen and Garcia were to purchase 
cocaine specifically from Walker and defendant (R. 481-82, 484-
85, 489, 504-06) . Defendant and Walker arrived at the pre-
arranged located at the specified time where they were met by 
Garcia (R. 488, 557). Garcia asked them whether they were 
carrying weapons or wearing wires, pulling up his shirt to show 
that he was acting in good faith. Defendant and Walker responded 
that they were not carrying weapons and also pulled up their 
shirts to show they were not wearing wires (R. 588) . This 
15
 See Appellant's Br. at 19 n.4 (citing Webster's New World 
Dictionary (2d ed.) (defining "arrange" as "to make ready; 
prepare or plan; to arrive at an agreement about; settle to come 
to an agreement with a person about a thing")). 
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conduct, which defendant readily participated in, is not typical 
in an employment interview. Rather, it shows that defendant knew 
that he was entering an illegal drug transaction. Coupled with 
his ready, though understated, participation in the negotiations, 
including his willingness to remaining at the cover location as 
"collateral" to insure the cocaine sale, and his obvious 
knowledge of Walker's cocaine suppliers, these facts support the 
jury's determination that the evidence was sufficient to convict 
defendant of arranging to distribute cocaine. 
POINT IV 
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S OTHER UNCHARGED, 
CONTEMPORANEOUS DRUG-RELATED CONDUCT WAS PROPERLY 
ADMITTED TO PROVE DEFENDANT'S STATE OF MIND AND INTENT. 
Relying primarily on State v. Doporto. 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. 18 
(Utah 1997), defendant claims that the trial court improperly and 
prejudicially admitted evidence of other bad acts in violation of 
rules 403 and 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence.16 The argument is 
16
 Prior to trial, defendant filed a motion in limine, 
pursuant to rules 4 03 and 4 04(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, 
requesting that the trial court redact portions of the videotape 
showing his discussion with undercover agents in which he offered 
to supply them with marijuana and LSD, and arguing that the 
discussion was irrelevant to the cocaine charge and prejudicial 
to defendant (R. 28-30, 179, 190, 219). The trial court denied 
the motion, finding that the entire videotape was relevant to 
defendant's state of mind and culpable mens rea as to the cocaine 
charge (R. 223). Recognizing, however, the danger of unfair 
prejudice stemming from defendant's reference to other uncharged 
drug-related conduct, the trial court directed defense counsel to 
draft an appropriate cautionary instruction, which was submitted 
to the jury (jury instruction #23, R. 103, attached at Addendum 
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without merit. 
A. The Standard for Admissibility in the Trial Court and 
the Standard pf RevjLgw pn Appeal. 
In Doporto. the defendant was convicted of sodomy on a child 
in a trial in which two girls testified that defendant had raped 
and sexually abused them when they were minors. Doporto, 3 08 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 19-20. In holding that the testimony was 
improperly admitted under rules 4 03 and 4 04(b), the supreme court 
set the following standards governing the trial court's 
determination of prior bad act evidence: 
To assure the integrity of the trial process, we hold 
that evidence of prior crimes is presumed to be 
inadmissible and that, prior to admitting it, the trial 
court must find that (1) there is a necessity for the 
prior crime evidence, (2) it is highly probative of a 
material issue of the crime charged, and (3) its 
special probativeness and the necessity for it outweigh 
its prejudicial effect. 
Id. at 21. 
Although the reviewing court will not review de novo the 
trial court's decision to admit evidence under rule 404(b), it 
"will examine a trial court's decision under rule 404(b) with 
very limited deference, according it a relatively small degree of 
discretion." Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. at 21. 
B; 223, 226-28) . 
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B. The Evidence was Necessary to Show Defendants 
Mental State and Intent to Commit the Offense, 
Defendant mistakenly argues that because there was some 
other evidence of his mental state and intent, his statements 
were not "necessary" under Doporto. He further confuses the 
relevant analysis by challenging the trial court's opinion that 
redacting the tape of defendant's statements about procuring LSD 
and marijuana would make it less understandable. Appellant's Br. 
at 27-29. 
Doporto states: 
[Other bad act evidence] must be necessary; it cannot 
be used to prove a point not really contested. 
Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22 (emphasis added). The supreme 
court found in that case that because the issues of defendant's 
motive and opportunity to commit the offense were uncontested, 
the girls' testimony on these points "was wholly unnecessary." 
Id. It is apparent that whether or not evidence is "necessary" 
under Doporto is a determination not based on the strength of 
proponent's other evidence, but whether, as a preliminary matter, 
the point is contested. See State v. Featherson. 781 P.2d 424, 
430 (Utah 1989) (finding evidence of same fact pattern in two 
offenses to show intent unnecessary "because there was not any 
serious doubt or question of those issues") (citing State v. 
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Winaet. 6 Utah 2d 243, 246, 310 P.2d 738, 740 (1957)). 
It is undisputed that defendant's mental state and intent to 
commit the charged offense were the central issues in the case, a 
fact defendant admits on appeal. Appellant's Br. at 28. 
Therefore, the "necessary" prong of Doporto is satisfied. 
C. Evidence of Defendants Promises to Procure 
Qth$r Pryigg wag PighJLy Probative pf frig Mentctl 
State and Intent to Commit the Charged Offense, 
Regarding the second prong of the test, Doporto states: 
[The other bad act evidence] must be strongly p obative 
of a material issue, a probativeness that cannot serve 
as a ruse for showing that the defendant's propensity 
is such that he is likely to have committed the kind of 
crime charged. 
Doporto, 3 08 Utah Adv. Rep. at 22. 
Defendant argues that his claim that he could obtain LSD and 
marijuana was not connected to Walker's sale of cocaine to the 
undercover agents, primarily because his promises were empty talk 
on which he never followed through. Appellant's Br. at 3 0-31. 
The issue, however, is not one of sufficiency, but of state of 
mind. "The relevant inquiry is whether the other acts have 
'clearly probative value with respect to the intent of the 
accused at the time of the offense charged.'" Featherson, 781 
P.2d at 430 (quoting United States v. Scott, 701 F.2d 1340, 
1345-46 (11th Cir.), reh'a denied, 707 F.2d 523 (11th Cir.), 
cert, denied, 464 U.S. 856, 104 S. Ct. 175 (1983)) (emphasis in 
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original). 
Evidence of defendant's contemporaneous promises to sell 
drugs, apparent on the videotape, necessarily reflect defendant's 
state of mind at the time of the cocaine sale and support the 
State's case that defendant came to the cover location to sell 
drugs. £££ State v. Johnson. 784 P.2d 1135, 1141 (Utah 1989) 
(threatening phone call was beginning of a string of closely 
related events properly admitted to show intent); State v. 
Ramirez, 924 P.2d 366, 370 (Utah App. 1996) ("'Proximity in time 
combined with similarity in type of crime virtually guarantees 
admittance of prior bad acts evidence.'") (quoting United States 
v, Prew, 894 F.2d 965, 970 (8th Cir.), cert. denjefl, 494 U.S. 
1089, 110 S. Ct. 1830 (1990)); State v. Lopez, 789 P.2d 39, 42-43 
(Utah App. 1990) (evidence of strangling attempt only minutes 
after murder in attempt to avoid being caught relevant to show 
intent to murder). 
Further, defendant's promises to sell LSD and marijuana at 
the undercover location is conduct virtually identical to his 
arranging to sell cocaine at precisely the same time and place. 
In State v. Gotschall. 782 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989), the defendant 
was convicted of second degree murder after he killed the victim 
by striking him several times with a pool cue. At trial, threats 
3 8 
to "bash in" other persons' heads that the defendant made earlier 
on the day of the killing were admitted to show his state of mind 
at the time of the crime, an issue that was vital to the 
defendant's claim of self-defense. Id. at 463. Distinguishing 
Featherson,17 the supreme court found admissible the challenged 
evidence because it "pertain[ed] to conduct almost identical with 
that charged." Gotschall. 782 P.2d at 462-63, 463 n.3. See also 
State v. Rocco. 795 P.2d 1116, 1119 (Utah 1990) (evidence of 
similar burning and burglary of another house on night of charged 
17
 Defendant relies on Featherson, which held, in reviewing 
an aggravated sexual assault conviction, that the defendant's 
ogling two women, one of whose skirts he lifted, earlier on the 
day of the offense, was not probative of the defendant's state of 
mind. Featherson, 781 P.2d at 427. Featherson, however, is 
distinguishable from this case, not only because in this case 
defendant's promises to supply other drugs were virtually 
contemporaneous with the cocaine transaction, but also because 
defendant's uncharged conduct was directed to precisely the same 
undercover agents involved in the illegal drug sale. See id. at 
427-28 (finding the seven to eight hour hiatus between the 
assault and the uncharged encounters not probative of intent, 
especially where the prior conduct involved women other than the 
victim in the case)(citations omitted). 
Defendant also relies on State v. DeAlo, 748 P.2d 194 (Utah 
App. 1987), holding that the defendant's handwritten Mope 
ledger," which recorded cocaine transactions in California, had 
questionable probative value because it neither recorded 
information that bore a relation to the cocaine seized in Utah 
nor demonstrated any conspiracy related to the Utah cocaine 
seizure. Id. at 199. DeAlo is also distinguishable from this 
case. First, other similarly inadmissible documents in DeAlo 
infected the balancing under rule 403. Id. In this case, only a 
single conversation is at issue. More importantly, the 
California dope ledger in DeAlo could not be connected with the 
charged conduct in Utah, whereas in this case defendant's 
promises to obtain drugs were contemporaneous with his appearance 
at the cover location for the purpose of selling other drugs. 
39 
offense admissible to prove intent); State v. Ramirez, 924 P.2d 
at 369-70 (prior, similar trips to California properly admitted 
under rule 404(b) to show intent); State v. Morrell, 803 P.2d 
292, 296 (Utah App. 1990) (prior theft of pizza delivery driver 
manifesting uan almost identical factual pattern" held 
admissible). 
Most importantly, defendant's promises to sell other drugs 
were relevant to the State's case that defendant was not at the 
cover location to apply for a job but to sell cocaine, and 
undercuts defendant's defense that he was merely present during 
the cocaine transaction (R. 179). See State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 
694, 700-701 (Utah App.) (finding admissible a prior conviction 
for distribution of cocaine to counter a "mere presence" defense 
in prosecution for distribution of methamphetamine), cert. 
denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993). £££ also State v. Pierce. 722 
P.2d 780, 782 (Utah 1986) (per curiam) (evidence in theft 
conviction that the defendant paid for stolen property with a 
contraband drug did not unfairly portray the defendant as a drug 
dealer); State v. Daniels, 584 P.2d 880, 881-82 (Utah 1978) (in 
theft of car conviction evidence of the defendant's siphoning gas 
was relevant to undermine defense theory that the car was not 
taken with intent to permanently deprive owner of car's use or 
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value). 
In sum, because evidence showed that defendant's promises to 
procure other drugs was contemporaneous and virtually identical 
to his arranging to sell cocaine, conduct which was, and because 
that evidence directly challenged the defense that he was merely 
present during the cocaine transaction, the evidence was highly 
probative of defendant's state of mind and intent to deal illegal 
drugs. 
D. The Special Probativeness and Necessity of Evidence 
of Defendant's Promises to Procure Other Drugs is 
not Outweighed by its Prejudicial Effect. 
In attacking the trial court's ruling, defendant argues 
that, because evidence of defendant's promises to procure other 
drugs was not strong and was unrelated to the charged conduct, 
there was a high probability that he was convicted because the 
jury believed he was a person likely to engage in drug sales. 
Appellant's Br. at 32. In so arguing, defendant principally 
relies on Doporto's general proposition that other bad act 
evidence is presumptively prejudicial. Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 21.18 
18
 DeAlo, cited by defendant in support, is distinguishable 
from this case in that the prosecution in that case presented no 
other evidence to prove intent to distribute. DeAlo, 74 8 P.2d at 
199. State v. Bell. 770 P.2d 100 (Utah 1988), is also 
distinguishable in that a number of other crimes were introduced 
in evidence without any clear rationale under rule 404(b), or 
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In Doporto. the supreme court did not outline the 
appropriate test to be applied under rule 403. Rather, it simply 
determined that the prior bad act evidence was inadmissible 
because it was neither necessary nor probative and because the 
prosecutor argued in closing that the evidence signaled 
defendant's propensity toward committing the charged conduct. 
Id. at 23-24. However, in State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 
1988), the court identified several factors to be considered in 
balancing probativeness against unfair prejudice under rule 
403.19 Although Doporto has somewhat altered the schema outlined 
in Shickles, by extracting "necessity" and making it a required 
showing under rule 404(b), see Doporto, 308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 21-
23, nothing in Doporto suggests that the Shickles factors should 
be abandoned as a useful guide in the rule 403 balancing test. 
Applying the relevant Shickles factors, admission of 
basis under rule 4 03, and without an adequate cautionary 
instruction. Id. at 111. In this case only a single instance of 
uncharged conduct was admitted, the trial court plainly, albeit 
implicitly, considered the potential for prejudice under rule 403 
by requesting defense counsel draft a cautionary instruction, and 
an appropriate instruction was given (R. 103). 
19
 The factors outlined in Shickles include: (1) the 
strength of the evidence as to the commission of the other crime, 
(2) the similarities between the crimes, (3) the interval of time 
that has elapsed between the crimes, (4) the need for the 
evidence, (5) the efficacy of alternative proof, and (6) the 
degree to which the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. Shickles, 760 P.2d at 295. 
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defendant's promises to procure other drugs was correct. The 
strength of evidence attesting to defendant's promises to supply 
other drugs is indisputable. The promises issued from his own 
mouth (R. 11:41:25-46:00). As discussed above, defendant's 
promises to procure other drugs referred to contemporaneous 
conduct virtually identical to the charged offense. Also, 
because the other bad act evidence in this case involves only the 
promise to supply other controlled substances, rather than 
references to sexual assault and rape, any prejudice stemming 
from defendant's promises is not particularly great. See 
Ramirez. 924 P.2d at 370 (finding that evidence of prior trips to 
purchase drugs "not of the sort that would likely 'rouse the jury 
to overmastering hostility'"); State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561, 570 
n.6, 572 (Utah App. 1991) (distinguishing between the potential 
prejudice arising from evidence related to controlled substances 
as opposed to "other more heinous or inflammatory types of prior 
bad act evidence"); O'Neil. 848 P.2d at 701 (finding jury would 
not be roused to overmastering hostility by admission of simple 
drug distribution charge). 
Only with respect to the efficacy of alternative proof is 
admission under rule 403 challengeable. Although, the evidence 
supporting defendant's intent to arrange to distribute was 
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substantial, that fact, in conjunction with the fact that 
evidence of defendant's uncharged conduct was highly probative, 
should not result in a determination of inadmissibility. See 
Shickles, 760 P.2d at 296 (even where "other evidences of 
defendant's intent" are introduced, "the use of . . . 
other-crimes evidence" is "not necessarily" precluded). 
Defendant mistakenly argues that upon hearing the other 
evidence of his claim that he knew where to buy drugs, the jury 
"could easily have concluded that he was the type of person who 
distributed drugs, and by virtue of his propensity for this type 
of behavior, arranged the deal between Walker and the agents." 
Appellant's Br. at 33. Rather, upon hearing that evidence in the 
context of all the other evidence, and focussing particularly on 
defendant's promises to procure drugs at precisely the same time 
that he was privy to a cocaine sale, the jury could only have 
concluded that defendant was at least a sometime drug dealer who 
was on the premises to sell cocaine. 
In sum, the special probativeness of defendant's uncharged 
conduct was not outweighed by its potential for undue prejudice, 
and the trial court correctly admitted the challenged evidence. 
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E. Even if it was Error to Admit Evidence of Defendant's 
Uncharged Conduct, the Error was Harmless, 
In Doporto. the court recognized that a conclusion that 
other bad act evidence was improperly admitted does not by itself 
require a reversal. Doporto. 308 Utah Adv. Rep. at 24. "A 
conviction will not be reversed even if there is error unless the 
error is 'prejudicial in the sense that there is a reasonable 
likelihood that in its absence there would have been a more 
favorable result for the defendant."' Id. (quoting State v. 
Johnson. 771 P.2d 1071, 1073 (Utah 1989)). 
However, even assuming it was error to admit evidence of 
defendant's uncharged conduct, there was no reasonable likelihood 
of a more favorable result. As discussed at Point III, the 
evidence in support of defendant's conviction was strong, even 
without consideration of defendant's uncharged conduct. 
Moreover, a cautionary instruction was given: 
In this case Mr. Hansen is charged only with the 
distribution, offering, agreeing, consenting, or 
arranging to distribute cocaine on August 2, 1994. Mr. 
Hansen's discussions with the undercover police about 
LSD, mushrooms and other drugs can only be considered 
by you to determine his intent and knowledge regarding 
the sale of cocaine and cannot without separate 
evidence be sufficient to find Mr. Hansen guilty of 
cocaine distribution. 
(R. 103). See Shickles. 760 P.2d at 296 (stating that a 
"defendant [is] entitled to a clear instruction to the jury 
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limiting the use it [can] make of the evidence"); Lopez, 789 P.2d 
at 39 (instruction that jury should consider evidence of each 
offense separately where failure to sever charges challenged 
tended to offset prejudice). Considering the strength of the 
evidence and the giving of an instruction directing the jury to 
consider defendant's references to other drug dealings only for 
the purpose of his intent and knowledge on the charged offense, 
any error in admitting the challenged evidence was harmless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that defendant's conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this >* day of May, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties. 
(1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties: 
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to 
knowingly and intentionally: 
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to 
produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or counterfeit sub-
stance; 
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, 
consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or counterfeit 
substance; 
(iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of his business as 
a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances 
listed in Schedules II through V except that he may possess such 
controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by a licensed 
practitioner; or 
(iv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to 
distribute. 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of 
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time. 
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is sub-
stantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the is-
sues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of 
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence. 
Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove 
conduct; exceptions; other crimes. 
(a) Character evidence generally. Evidence of a person's character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in confor-
mity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
(1) Character of accused. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same; 
(2) Character of victim. Evidence of a pertinent trait of character of 
the victim of the crime offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to 
rebut the same, or evidence of a character trait of peacefulness of the 
victim offered by the prosecution in a homicide case to rebut evidence that 
the victim was the first aggressor; 
(3) Character of witness. Evidence of the character of a witness, as 
provided in Rules 607, 608, and 609. 
(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or 
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show 
action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other pur-
poses, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowl-
edge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident. 
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.) 
ADDENDUM B 
JUN 5 1S38 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF TEE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, 6TATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TED CHARLES HANSEN, 
Defendant. 
: INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
: CRIMINAL NO. 961900374 
I 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant TED CHARLES HANSEN 
is charged by the Information which has been duly filed with the 
commission Of UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION. OFFERING, AGREEING. 
CONSENTING OR ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED OR COUNTERFEIT 
SUBSTANCE The Information alleges: 
UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION, OFFERING, AGREEING, CONSENTING OR 
ARRANGING TO DISTRIBUTE A CONTROLLED OR COUNTERFEIT SUBSTANCE, a 
Second Degree Felony, at 1063 East 3300 South, in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, on or about August 2, 1994, in violation of Title 
58, Chapter 37, Section 8(1)(a)(ii), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, in that the defendant, TED CHARLES HANSEN, as a party to 
the offense, did knowingly and intentionally distribute, offer, 
agree, consent or arrange to distribute a controlled substance, to 
wit: Cocaine, a Schedule II Controlled Substance. 
§€§€83 
INSTRUCTION # 2 
Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered by you as a statement of the facts proven in this 
case, but is to be regarded by you merely as a summarized statement of the allegations of the 
information. The mere fact that the defendant stands charged with an offense is not to be 
taken by you as any evidence of guilt. 
INSTRUCTION # 3 
You are instructed that to the Information the defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. 
The plea of not guilty denies each and all of the essential allegations of the charge contained 
in the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each and all of the essential 
allegations thereof to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION # 4 
You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been charged with this 
offense and has been held to answer to the charge by a committing magistrate, is not any 
evidence of guilt and is not even a circumstance which should be considered by you in 
determining guilt or innocence. 
0008SI 
INSTRUCTION * £ 
It becomes my duty as Judge to instruct you concerning the law applicable to this case, 
and it is your duty as jurors to follow the law as I shall state it to you. 
The function of the jury is to try the issues of fact that are presented by the allegations in 
the Information filed in this court and the defendant's plea of "not guilty/ This duty you 
should perform uninfluenced by pity for the defendant or by passion or prejudice against 
him. You must not allow yourselves to be biased against the defendant because of the fact 
that the defendant has been arrested for this offense, or because an Information has been 
filed, or because the defendant has been brought before the court to stand trial. None of 
these facts are evidence of guilt, and you are not permitted to infer or to speculate from any 
or all of them that the defendant is more likely to be guilty than innocent. 
You are to be governed solely by the evidence introduced in this trial and the law as 
stated to you by me. The law forbids you to be governed by mere sentiment, conjecture, 
sympathy, passion, prejudice, public opinion or public feeling. Both the State of Utah and 
the defendant have a right to demand and they do demand and expect that you will 
conscientiously and dispassionately consider and weigh the evidence and apply the law of the 
case, that you will reach a just verdict regardless of what the consequences of such verdict 
may be. The verdict must express the individual opinion of each juror. 
000085 
INSTRUCTION NO. H 
To constitute the crime charged in the information there 
must be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct 
prohibited by law and the appropriate culpable mental state or 
states with regard to the conduct prohibited by law. 
Before a defendant may be found guilty of a crime, the 
evidence must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the 
information and that the defendant committed such conduct with 
the culpable mental state required for such offense. 
"Conduct" means an act or omission. 
"Act" means a voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. 
"Omission" means a failure to act when there is a legal duty 
to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
•000S4 
INSTRUCTION NO. \<Z 
Under the law of the State of Utah, it is unlawful for any 
person to knowingly and intentionally distribute a controlled or 
counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to 
distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance. 
INSTRUCTION NO- 1 U? 
You are instructed that a person engages in conduct: 
Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to 
the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it 
is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or 
cause the result. 
Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his conduct or 
to circumstances surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the 
nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. A person 
acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of 
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably 
certain to cause the result. 
0 0 0 0 9 6 
INSTRUCTION NO. r| 
The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind 
and connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state of 
mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by direct and positive 
evidence and may ordinarily be inferred from acts, conduct, 
statements and circumstances. 
000087 
INSTRUCTION NO. \*Z 
Intent and motive should never be confused. Motive is what 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to 
the state of mind with which an act is done or omitted. 
Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not 
be proven. The motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar 
as evidence of motive may aid in your determination of state of 
mind or intent. 
080088 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ D 
Before you can convict the defendant, Ted Charles Hansen, of 
the offense of Unlawful Distribution, Offering, Agreeing, 
Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a Controlled Substance as 
charged in the information, you must find from all of the 
evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the 
following elements of that offense: 
1. That on or about the 2nd day of August, 1994, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the defendant, Ted Charles Hansen, 
distributed, offered, agreed, consented, or arranged to 
distribute Cocaine; and 
2. That Cocaine was then and there a controlled substance; 
and 
3. That said defendant did so intentionally and knowingly. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in 
this case, you are convinced of the truth of each and every one 
of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you 
must find the defendant guilty of Unlawful Distribution, 
Offering, Agreeing, Consenting or Arranging to Distribute a 
Controlled Substance as charged in the information. If, on the 
other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of 
any one or more of the foregoing elements, then you must find the 
defendant not guilty. 
fi n n 4 A A 
INSTRUCTION NO. Q\ 
You are instructed that cocaine is, and was at the time of 
the alleged offense, a controlled substance. 
"Arranging" means any witting or intentional lending of aid 
in any form of any act in furtherance of aiding in the 
distribution of controlled substances. 
"Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or 
dispensing a controlled substance. 
"Deliver" means the actual, constructive, or attempted 
transfer of a controlled substance, whether or not an agency 
relationship exists. 
000101 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22t 
Under the law in the State of Utah any act in furtherance of 
arranging to distribute a controlled substance is a criminal 
offense pursuant to statute. 
000102 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ ^ 
In this case Mr. Hansen is charged only with the distribution, 
offering, agreeing, consenting, or arranging to distribute cocaine 
on August 2, 1994. Mr. Hansen's discussions with the undercover 
police about LSD, mushrooms, and other drugs can only be considered 
by you to determine his intent and knowledge regarding the sale of 
cocaine and cannot without separate evidence be sufficient to find 
Mr. Hansen guilty of cocaine distribution. 
000163 
INSTRUCTION # 3f\ 
If in these instruction any rule, direction or idea has been stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are 
not to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the 
others, but you are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light 
of all the others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
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